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overshoot/collapse remain controversial. Collapses have occurred frequently in history, often followed by centu-
ries of economic, intellectual, and population decline. Many different natural and social phenomena have been
invoked to explain speciﬁc collapses, but a general explanation remains elusive.
In this paper, we build a human population dynamics model by adding accumulated wealth and economic in-
equality to a predator–prey model of humans and nature. The model structure, and simulated scenarios that
offer signiﬁcant implications, are explained. Four equations describe the evolution of Elites, Commoners, Nature,
andWealth. The model shows Economic Stratiﬁcation or Ecological Strain can independently lead to collapse, in
agreement with the historical record.
Themeasure “Carrying Capacity” is developed and its estimation is shown to be a practicalmeans for early detec-
tion of a collapse. Mechanisms leading to two types of collapses are discussed. The new dynamics of this model
can also reproduce the irreversible collapses found inhistory. Collapse can be avoided, and population can reach a
steady state atmaximum carrying capacity if the rate of depletion of nature is reduced to a sustainable level and if
resources are distributed equitably.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
There are widespread concerns that current trends in population
and resource-use are unsustainable, but the possibilities of an overshoot
and collapse remain unclear and controversial. How real is the possi-
bility of a societal collapse? Can complex, advanced civilizations really
collapse? It is common to portray human history as a relentless and in-
evitable trend toward greater levels of social complexity, political orga-
nization, and economic specialization, with the development of more
complex and capable technologies supporting ever-growing popula-
tion, all sustained by the mobilization of ever-increasing quantities of
material, energy, and information. Yet this is not inevitable. In fact,
cases where this seemingly near-universal, long-term trend has been
severely disrupted by a precipitous collapse – often lasting centuries –
have been quite common. A brief review of some examples of collapses
suggests that the process of rise-and-collapse is actually a recurrent
cycle found throughout history, making it important to establish aerodrigorivas@gmail.com
. Open access under CC BY license.general explanation of this process (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997; Gold-
stein, 1988; Meadows et al., 1972; Modelski, 1987; Tainter, 1988;
Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Yoffee and Cowgill, 1988).
The Roman Empire's dramatic collapse (followed bymany centuries
of population decline, economic deterioration, intellectual regression,
and the disappearance of literacy) is well known, but it was not the
ﬁrst rise-and-collapse cycle in Europe. Prior to the rise of Classical
Greco-Roman civilization, both the Minoan and Mycenaean Civiliza-
tions had each risen, reached very advanced levels of civilization, and
then collapsed virtually completely (Morris, 2006; Redman, 1999).
The history of Mesopotamia – the very cradle of civilization, agriculture,
complex society, and urban life–presents a series of rise-and-declines in-
cluding the Sumerians, the Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Achaemenid,
Seleucid, Parthian, Sassanid, Umayyad, and Abbasid Empires (Redman
et al., 2004; Yoffee, 1979). In neighboring Egypt, this cycle also appeared
repeatedly. In both Anatolia and in the Indus Valley, the very large and
long-lasting Hittite and Harrapan civilizations both collapsed so
completely that their very existencewas unknown until modern arche-
ology rediscovered them. Similar cycles of rise and collapse occurred re-
peatedly in India, most notably with the Mauryan and the Gupta
Empires (Edwards et al., 1971, 1973; Jansen et al., 1991; Kenoyer,
1998; Thapar, 2004). Southeast Asia similarly experienced “multiple
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ries, culminating in the Khmer Empire based in Angkor, which itself
was depopulated and swallowed by the forest during the 15th Century
(Stark, 2006). Chinese history is, verymuch like Egypt's, full of repeated
cycles of rises and collapses, with each of the Zhou, Han, Tang, and Song
Empires followedby a very serious collapse of political authority and so-
cioeconomic progress (Chu and Lee, 1994; Lee, 1931; Needham and
Wang, 1956).
Collapses are not restricted to the “OldWorld”. The collapse of Maya
Civilization is well known and evokes widespread fascination, both be-
cause of the advanced nature ofMayan society and because of the depth
of the collapse (Demerest et al., 2004; Webster, 2002). As Diamond
(2005) puts it, it is difﬁcult to ignore “the disappearance of between
90 and 99% of the Maya population after A.D. 800…and the disappear-
ance of kings, Long Count calendars, and other complex political and
cultural institutions.” In the nearby central highlands of Mexico, a
number of powerful states also rose to high levels of power and prosper-
ity and then rapidly collapsed, Teotihuacan (the sixth largest city in the
world in the 7th C) and Monte Alban being just the largest of these to
experience dramatic collapse, with their populations declining to
about 20–25% of their peak within just a few generations (Tainter,
1988).
We know of many other collapses including Mississippian Cultures
such as Cahokia, South West US cultures such as the Pueblo and
Hohokam, Andean civilizations such as Tiwanaku, Sub-Saharan civiliza-
tions such as Great Zimbabwe, and many collapses across the Paciﬁc
Islands, such as Easter Island. It is also likely other collapses have also
occurred in societies that were not at a sufﬁcient level of complexity
to produce written records or archeological evidence. Indeed, a recent
study (Shennan et al., 2013) of the Neolithic period in Europe has
shown that “in contrast to the steady population growth usually as-
sumed, the introduction of agriculture into Europe was followed by a
boom-and-bust pattern in the density of regional populations”. Further-
more “most regions show more than one boom–bust pattern”, and in
most regions, population declines “of the order of the 30–60%” can be
found. The authors also argue that, rather than climate change or
diseases, the timing and evidence point to endogenous causes for
these collapses in 19 out of 23 cases studied, suggesting the possibil-
ity of “rapid population growth driven by farming to unsustainable
levels”. Moreover, through wavelet analysis of the archeological data,
S. Downey [personal communication] has shown that the average
length of such boom-and-bust cycles is about 300–500 years.
In summary, despite the common impression that societal collapse is
rare, or even largely ﬁctional, “the picture that emerges is of a process
recurrent in history, and global in its distribution” (Tainter, 1988). See
also Yoffee and Cowgill (1988), Goldstein (1988), Ibn Khaldun (1958),
Kondratieff (1984), and Parsons (1991). As Turchin and Nefedov
(2009) contend, there is a great deal of support for “the hypothesis
that secular cycles — demographic–social–political oscillations of a
very long period (centuries long) are the rule, rather than an exception
in the large agrarian states and empires.”
This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is simi-
larly susceptible. It may seem reasonable to believe that modern civili-
zation, armed with its greater technological capacity, scientiﬁc
knowledge, and energy resources, will be able to survive and endure
whatever crises historical societies succumbed to. But the brief over-
view of collapses demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenome-
non, but also the extent to which advanced, complex, and powerful
societies are susceptible to collapse. The fall of the Roman Empire, and
the equally (if not more) advanced Han, Mauryan, and Gupta Empires,
as well as so many advanced Mesopotamian Empires, are all testimony
to the fact that advanced, sophisticated, complex, and creative civiliza-
tions can be both fragile and impermanent.
A large number of explanations have been proposed for each speciﬁc
case of collapse, including one or more of the following: volcanoes,
earthquakes, droughts, ﬂoods, changes in the courses of rivers, soildegradation (erosion, exhaustion, salinization, etc.), deforestation, cli-
mate change, tribalmigrations, foreign invasions, changes in technology
(such as the introduction of ironworking), changes in the methods or
weapons of warfare (such as the introduction of horse cavalry, armored
infantry, or long swords), changes in trade patterns, depletion of partic-
ular mineral resources (e.g., silver mines), cultural decline and social
decadence, popular uprisings, and civil wars. However, these explana-
tions are speciﬁc to each particular case of collapse rather than general.
Moreover, even for the speciﬁc case where the explanation applies, the
society in question usually had already experienced the phenomenon
identiﬁed as the cause without collapsing. For example, the Minoan so-
ciety had repeatedly experienced earthquakes that destroyed palaces,
and they simply rebuilt them more splendidly than before. Indeed,
many societies experience droughts, ﬂoods, volcanoes, soil erosion,
and deforestation with no major social disruption (Tainter, 1988).
The same applies to migrations, invasions, and civil wars. The
Roman, Han, Assyrian, and Mauryan Empires were, for centuries, com-
pletely militarily hegemonic, successfully defeating the neighboring
“barbarian” peoples who eventually did overrun them. So external
military pressure alone hardly constitutes an explanation for their
collapses. With both natural disasters and external threats, identifying
a speciﬁc cause compels one to ask, “yes, but why did this particular
instance of this factor produce the collapse?” Other processes must be
involved, and, in fact, the political, economic, ecological, and technolog-
ical conditions under which civilizations have collapsed have varied
widely. Individual collapses may have involved an array of speciﬁc fac-
tors, with particular triggers, but a general explanation remains elusive.
Individual explanations may seem appropriate in their particular case,
but the very universal nature of the phenomenon implies a mechanism
that is not speciﬁc to a particular time period of human history, nor a
particular culture, technology, or natural disaster (Tainter, 1988;
Turchin, 2003; Yoffee and Cowgill, 1988).
In this paperwe attempt tomodel collapsemathematically in amore
generalway.We propose a simplemodel, not intended to describe actu-
al individual cases, but rather to provide a general framework that
allows carrying out “thought experiments” for the phenomenon of
collapse and to test changes that would avoid it. This model (called
HANDY, for Human and Nature DYnamics) advances beyond existing
biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling
two separate important features which seem to appear across so
many societies that have collapsed: (1) the stretching of resources due
to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity (Abel, 1980;
Catton, 1980; Kammen, 1994; Ladurie, 1987; Ponting, 1991; Postan,
1966; Redman, 1999; Redman et al., 2004; Wood, 1998; Wright,
2004), and (2) the economic stratiﬁcation of society into Elites and
Masses (or “Commoners”) (Brenner, 1985; Parsons, 1991; Turchin,
2005, 2006; Turchin and Nefedov, 2009; Diamond, 2005; Goldstone,
1991; Ibn Khaldun, 1958). Inmany of these historical cases, we have di-
rect evidence of Ecological Strain and Economic Stratiﬁcation playing a
central role in the character or in the process of the collapse (Culbert,
1973; Diamond, 2005; Goldstone, 1991; Lentz, 2000; Mitchell, 1990).
For these empirical reasons, and the theoretical ones explained in
Section 3, our model incorporates both of these two features. Although
similar to the Brander and Taylor (1998)model (hereafter referred to as
“BT”) in that HANDY is based on the classical predator–prey model, the
inclusion of two societal classes introduces a much richer set of dynam-
ical solutions, including cycles of societal and ecological collapse, aswell
as the possibility of smoothly reaching equilibrium (the ecological car-
rying capacity). We use Carrying Capacity in its biological deﬁnition:
the population level that the resources of a particular environment
can sustain over the long term (Catton, 1980; Cohen, 1995; Daly and
Farley, 2003). In this paper, we call these environment resources
“Nature”.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of
the predator–preymodel; Section 3 includes themathematical descrip-
tion of HANDY; Section 4 covers a theoretical analysis of the model
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narios within three distinct types of societies; Section 6 gives an overall
discussion of the scenarios from Section 5; and Section 7 offers a short
summary of the paper and a discussion of future work.
2. Predator–Prey Model
The predator–prey model, the original inspiration behind HANDY,
was derived independently by two mathematicians, Alfred Lotka and
Vitto Volterra, in the early 20th century (Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1926).
Thismodel describes the dynamics of competition between two species,
say, wolves and rabbits. The governing system of equations is
x˙ ¼ ayð Þx−bx
y˙ ¼ cy− dxð Þy :

ð1Þ
In the above system, x represents the predator (wolf) population; y
represents the prey (rabbit) population; a determines the predator's
birth rate, i.e., the faster growth of wolf population due to availability
of rabbits; b is the predator's death rate; c is the prey's birth rate; d de-
termines the predation rate, i.e., the rate at which rabbits are hunted by
wolves.
Rather than reaching a stable equilibrium, the predator and prey
populations show periodic, out-of-phase variations about the equilibri-
um values
xe ¼ c=d
ye ¼ b=a :

ð2Þ
Note consistency of the units on the left and right hand sides of
Eqs. (1) and (2). A typical solution of the predator–prey system can be
seen in Fig. 1.
3. HANDY
As indicated above, Human And Nature DYnamics (HANDY) was
originally built based on the predator–prey model. We can think of
the human population as the “predator”, while nature (the natural
resources of the surrounding environment) can be taken as the “prey”,
depleted by humans. In animal models, carrying capacity is an upper
ceiling on long-term population. When the population surpasses the
carrying capacity, mechanisms such as starvation or migration bring
the population back down. However, in the context of human societies,Predator (wolves) and Prey (rabbits) Populations400 wolves
2,000 rabbits
200 wolves
1,000 rabbits
0 wolves
0 rabbits
Time (year)
Predator
Prey
Fig. 1. A typical solution of the predator–prey system obtained by run-
ning the system with the following parameter values and initial con-
ditions: a=3.0 × 10−5 (rabbits·years)−1; b= 2.0 × 10−2 years−1,
c= 3.0 × 10−2 years−1, d = 2.0 × 10−4 (wolves·years)−1; x(0) =
1.0 × 10+2 wolves; and y(0) = 1.0 × 10+3 rabbits. Predator popu-
lation is measured in units of wolves, Prey population is measured
in units of rabbits, and Time is measured in units of years.the population does not necessarily begin to decline upon passing the
threshold of carrying capacity, because, unlike animals, humans can
accumulate large surpluses (i.e., wealth) and then draw down those re-
sourceswhen production can no longermeet the needs of consumption.
This introduces a different kind of delay that allows formuchmore com-
plex dynamics, fundamentally altering the behavior and output of the
model. Thus, our model adds the element of accumulated surplus not
required in animal models, but which we feel is necessary for human
models. We call this accumulated surplus “wealth”.
Empirically, however, this accumulated surplus is not evenly distrib-
uted throughout society, but rather has been controlled by an elite. The
mass of the population, while producing the wealth, is only allocated a
small portion of it by elites, usually at or just above subsistence levels.
Based on this, and on the historical cases discussed in the introduction,
we separated the population into “Elites” and “Commoners”, and intro-
duced a variable for accumulated wealth. For an analysis of this two-
class structure of modern society, see Drăgulescu and Yakovenko
(2001) and Banerjee and Yakovenko (2010). This adds a different di-
mension of predationwhereby Elites “prey” on theproduction ofwealth
by Commoners. As a result, HANDY consists of four prediction equa-
tions: two for the two classes of population, Elites and Commoners,
denoted by xE and xC, respectively; one for the natural resources or
Nature, y; and one for the accumulatedWealth,w, referred to hereafter
as “Wealth”. This minimal set of four equations seems to capture essen-
tial features of the human–nature interaction and is capable of produc-
ing major potential scenarios of collapse or transition to steady state.
A similar model of population and renewable resource dynamics
based on the predator–prey model was developed in the pioneering
work of Brander and Taylor (1998) demonstrating that reasonable
parameter values can produce cyclical “feast and famine” patterns of
population and resources. Their model showed that a system with a
slow-growing resource base will exhibit overshooting and collapse,
whereas a more rapidly growing resource base will produce an adjust-
ment of population and resources toward equilibrium values. They
then applied this model to the historical case of Easter Island, ﬁnding
that the model provides a plausible explanation of the population
dynamics known about Easter Island from the archeological and scien-
tiﬁc record. They thus argue that the Polynesian caseswhere population
did collapse were due to smaller maximum resource bases (which they
call “carrying capacity”) that grew more slowly, whereas those cases
which did not experience such a collapsewere due to having a larger re-
source base (i.e., a larger carrying capacity). They then speculate that
their model might be consistent with other historical cases of collapse,
such as the ancient Mesopotamian and Maya civilizations or modern
Rwanda.
However, the BT approach only models Population and Nature and
does not include a central component of these historical cases: econom-
ic stratiﬁcation and the accumulation of wealth. Thus, despite clear evi-
dence for a stratiﬁed class structure in Easter Island's history prior to the
collapse (as well as for Mesopotamia, the ancient Maya, and modern
Rwanda), the BT model does not include class stratiﬁcation as a factor.
In theirmodel, society produces and consumes as a single homogeneous
unit. We feel that a historically realistic modeling of the evolution of
human–nature dynamics in these stratiﬁed complex societies cannot
be achieved without including this class stratiﬁcation in the model.
Brander and Taylor recognize that their model is simple, and that appli-
cation to more complex scenarios may require further development of
the structure of the model. We have found that including economic
stratiﬁcation, in the form of the introduction of Elites and Commoners,
as well as accumulatedWealth, results in a much richer variety of solu-
tions, whichmay have awider application across different types of soci-
eties. HANDY's structure also allows for “irreversible” collapses, without
the need to introduce an explicit critical depensation mechanism into
the model as other models need to do. Thus while the Brander–Taylor
model has only two equations, HANDY has four equations to predict
the evolution of the rich and poor populations (Elites and Commoners),
93S. Motesharrei et al. / Ecological Economics 101 (2014) 90–102Nature, and accumulated Wealth (we examine other differences in
Section 6.4 of the paper) The HANDY equations are given by:
x˙C ¼ βCxC−αCxC
x˙E ¼ βExE−αExE
y˙¼ γy λ−yð Þ−δxCy
w˙¼ δxCy−CC−CE:
8><
>:
ð3Þ
It is to be noted thatαC,αE, CC, and CE are all functions ofw, xC, and xE.
See Eqs. (4) and (6) and Fig. 2a and b.
3.1. Model Description
The total population is divided between the two variables, xC and xE,
representing the population of commoners and of elites. The population
grows through a birth rate β and decreases through a death rate α. β is
assumed to be constant for both Elites and Commoners but α depends
on Wealth as explained below.
In reality, natural resources exist in three forms: nonrenewable
stocks (fossil fuels, mineral deposits, etc.), regenerating stocks (forests,
soils, animal herds, wild ﬁsh stocks, game animals, aquifers, etc.), and
renewable ﬂows (wind, solar radiation, precipitation, rivers, etc.). Fu-
ture generations of the model will disaggregate these forms. We have
adopted a single formulation intended to represent an amalgamation
of the three forms, allowing for a clear understanding of the role that
natural resources play in collapse or sustainability of human societies.
Thus, the equation for Nature includes a regeneration term,
γy(λ − y), and a depletion term, −δxCy. The regeneration term has
been written in the form of a logistic equation, with a regeneration fac-
tor, γ, exponential regrowth for low values of y, and saturation when y
approaches λ, Nature's capacity —maximum size of Nature in absence
of depletion. As a result, the maximum rate of regeneration takes
place when y= λ / 2. Production is understood according to the stan-
dard Ecological Economics formulations as involving both inputs from,
and outputs to, Nature (i.e., depletion of natural sources and pollution
of natural sinks) (Daly, 1996; Daly and Farley, 2003). This ﬁrst genera-
tion of HANDYmodels the depletion side of the equation as if it includes
the reduction in Nature due to pollution.
The depletion term includes a rate of depletion per worker, δ, and
is proportional to both Nature and the number of workers. However,
the economic activity of Elites is modeled to represent executive,
management, and supervisory functions, but not engagement in the di-
rect extraction of resources, which is done by Commoners. Thus, only
Commoners produce.a) Consumption rates in HANDY
Fig. 2. Per capita Consumption rates and Death rates for Elites and Common
moners start experiencing famine when wwth ≤1, while Elites do not experi
Wealth.It is frequently claimed that technological change can reduce resource
depletion and therefore increase carrying capacity. However, the effects
of technological change on resource use are not unidirectional. Techno-
logical change can raise the efﬁciency of resource use, but it also tends to
raise both per capita resource consumption and the scale of resource ex-
traction, so that, absent policy effects, the increases in consumption
often compensate for the increased efﬁciency of resource use. These
are associated with the phenomena referred to as the Jevons Paradox,
and the “Rebound Effect” (Greening et al., 2000; Polimeni et al., 2008;
Ruth, 2009). For example, an increase in vehicle fuel efﬁciency tends
to enable increased per capita vehicle miles driven, heavier cars, and
higher average speeds, which then negate the gains from the increased
fuel-efﬁciency. In addition, technological advances can enable greater
resource extraction and throughput, which then appears as increases
in the productivity of other factors of production. As Daly points out,
much of the increase in productivity in both agriculture and industry
in the last two centuries has actually come from increased (rather
than decreased) resource throughput (Daly, 1991). A decline in the
price of a resource is usually thought to reﬂect an increase in the abun-
dance of that resource, but in fact, it often reﬂects that the resource is
simply being extracted more rapidly. Rather than extend carrying ca-
pacity, this reduces it. Over the long-term, per capita resource-use has
tended to rise over time despite dramatic technological advances in re-
source efﬁciency. Thus, the sign and magnitude of the effect of techno-
logical change on resource use varies and the overall effect is difﬁcult
to predict. Therefore, in this generation of HANDY, we assume that the
effects of these trends cancel each other out. The model will be devel-
oped further to allow the rates of these technology-induced trends to
be adjusted in either direction.
Finally, there is an equation for accumulatedWealth,which increases
with production, δxCy, and decreases with the consumption of the Elites
and the Commoners, CC and CE, respectively. The consumption of the
Commoners (as long as there is enough wealth to pay them) is sxC, a
subsistence salary per capita, s, multiplied by the working population.
The Elites pay themselves a salary κ times larger, so that the consump-
tion of the Elites is κsxE. However, when the wealth becomes too small
to pay for this consumption, i.e., when w b wth, the payment is reduced
and eventually stopped, and famine takes place, with amuchhigher rate
of death. κ is meant to represent here the factors that determine the di-
vision of the output of the total production of society between elites and
masses, such as the balance of class power between elites and masses,
and the capacity of each group to organize and pursue their economic
interests.We recognize the inherent limitations, in this initial generation
of our model, of holding that balance (κ) constant in each scenario, but
we expect to develop κ further in later generations of HANDY so that it
can be endogenously determined by other factors in the model.b) Death rates in HANDY
ers as a function of Wealth. Famine starts when Csx ≤1. Therefore, Com-
ence famine until wwth ≤
1
κ . This delay is due to Elites' unequal access to
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spectively, are given by the following equations:
CC ¼ min 1;
w
wth
 
sxC
CE ¼ min 1;
w
wth
 
κsxE
:
8><
>:
ð4Þ
Wealth threshold, wth, is a threshold value for wealth below which
famine starts. It depends on the “minimum required consumption per
capita”, ρ:
wth ¼ ρxC þ κρxE: ð5Þ
Even when Commoners start experiencing famine, i.e., when w ≤
wth, the Elites continue consuming unequally as indicated by the factor
κ in the second term on the right hand side of Eq. (5). A graphical repre-
sentation of the consumption rates are given in Fig. 2a.
The death rates for the Commoner and the Elite, αC and αE, are func-
tions of consumption rates:
αC ¼ αm þmax 0;1−
CC
sxC
 
αM−αmð Þ
αE ¼ αm þmax 0;1−
CE
sxE
 
αM−αmð Þ
:
8><
>:
ð6Þ
The death rates vary between a normal (healthy) value, αm, ob-
served when there is enough food for subsistence, and a maximum
(famine) value, αM that prevails when the accumulated wealth has
been used up and the population starves. There are a variety of mecha-
nisms which can reduce population when it exceeds carrying capacity,
including everything from emigration, increased disease susceptibility,
and outright starvation to breakdowns in social order and increased so-
cial violence, such as banditry, riots, rebellions, revolutions, and wars.
These mechanisms are described in detail in Turchin (2003) but the
net effect of all of them is a reduction in population, and that is what
the dynamics of ourmodel is meant to represent whenwe say “popula-
tion decline” or “famine”. Note also that an increase in the death rates
(α) is equivalent to an equal decrease in the birth rates (β). The death
rates αC and αE can be expressed in terms of wwth, a graphical representa-
tion of which is given Fig. 2b.
3.2. A Note on Units and Dimensions
There are three dimensions for quantities in HANDY:
1. Population (either Commoner or Elite), in units of people.
2. Nature/Wealth, in units of “eco-Dollars”.
3. Time, in units of years.
The structure of the model requires Nature and Wealth to be mea-
sured with the same units, therefore we created the unit eco-dollar.
Other parameters and functions in the model carry units that are com-
patible with the abovementioned dimensions following Eq. (3). For ex-
ample, Carrying Capacity, χ, and the Maximum Carrying Capacity, χM,
deﬁned in Section 4.1, are both expressed in units of people.
4. Equilibrium Values and Carrying Capacity
We can use the model to ﬁnd a sustainable equilibrium and maxi-
mum carrying capacity in different types of societies. In order for popu-
lation to reach an equilibrium, we must have αm ≤ βE ≤ βC ≤ αM. We
deﬁne a dimensionless parameter, η:
η ¼ αM−βC
αM−αm
: ð7ÞSince we assume αm ≤ βC ≤ αM, ηwill always be bounded by 0 ≤
η ≤ 1.
4.1. Equilibrium when xE = 0 (No Elites): Egalitarian Society
Assuming xE ≡ 0, we can ﬁnd the equilibrium values of the system
(subscript “e” denotes the equilibrium values):
xC;e ¼
γ
δ
λ−η s
δ
 
ye ¼ η
s
δ
we ¼ ηρxC;e
:
8><
>:
ð8Þ
We deﬁneχ, the Carrying Capacity for the population, to be equal to
xC,e in Eq. (8), i.e., the equilibrium value of the population in the absence
of Elites:
χ ¼ γ
δ
λ−η s
δ
 
: ð9Þ
Carrying Capacity can be maximized if Nature's regeneration rate is
maximal, i.e., if ye ¼ λ2. This requires δ to be set equal to a value δ* that
can result in a steady statewith themaximum (sustainable) Population,
which in this paper we call the “optimal” value of δ. From the second
equation in Eq. (8), it can be seen that δ* is given by:
δ ¼
2ηs
λ
: ð10Þ
The Maximum Carrying Capacity, χM, is thus given by:
χM ¼
γ
δ
λ
2
¼ γ
ηs
λ
2
 2
: ð11Þ
4.2. Equilibrium when xE ≥ 0 and κ=1 (No Inequality): Equitable Society
If we set κ ≡ 1 and βE ≡ βC ≡ β, we can reach an equilibrium state for
which xE ≥ 0. This case models an equitable society of “Workers” and
“Non-Workers”. We need a dimensionless free parameter φ that sets
the initial ratio of the Non-Workers to Workers:
φ ¼ xE 0ð Þ
xC 0ð Þ
: ð12Þ
The equilibrium values of the system can then be expressed as
follows:
xC;e ¼
γ
δ
λ−η s
δ
1þ φð Þ
 
xE;e ¼ φxC;e
ye ¼ η
s
δ
1þ φð Þ
we ¼ ηρ 1þ φð ÞxC;e
:
8>><
>>:
ð13Þ
The total population xe= xC,e+ xE,e can still bemaximized by choos-
ing δ appropriately:
δ ¼
2ηs
λ
1þ φð Þ: ð14Þ
This δ** is larger than the optimal depletion factor given by Eq. (10).
The difference arises becauseWorkers have to produce more than they
need just for themselves in order to support Non-Workers. For this
choice of δ, total population is given by:
xe;M ¼ 1þ φð Þ
γ
δ
λ
2
¼ γ
ηs
λ
2
 2
: ð15Þ
Table 1
Description of parameters and state variables used in HANDY. κ, δ, and xE are varied to
study various scenarios in three different types of societies. xE = 0 deﬁnes an Egalitarian
society with no Elites. κ = 1 deﬁnes an Equitable society with Workers and Non-
Workers, represented by xC and xE in this case, respectively. xE≥ 0 and κ N 1 deﬁne an un-
equal societywith Elites and Commoners (xE and xC). As a reference, all other variables and
functions in HANDY are also listed above. Subscript e denotes equilibrium value every-
where in this paper.
Parameter symbol Parameter name Typical value(s)
αm Normal (minimum) death rate 1.0 × 10−2
αM Famine (maximum) death rate 7.0 × 10−2
βC Commoner birth rate 3.0 × 10−2
βE Elite birth rate 3.0 × 10−2
s Subsistence salary per capita 5.0 × 10−4
ρ Threshold wealth per capita 5.0 × 10−3
γ Regeneration rate of nature 1.0 × 10−2
λ Nature carrying capacity 1.0 × 10+2
κ Inequality factor 1, 10, 100
δ Depletion (production) factor None
Variable symbol Variable name Typical initial value(s)
xC Commoner population 1.0 × 10+2
xE Elite population 0, 1, 25
y Nature λ
w Accumulated wealth 0
(a). List of parameters in HANDY. κ and δ take different values for different scenarios.
(b). List of state variables in HANDY. xE(0) takes different values for different scenarios.
Table 2
As a reference, all other variables and functions in HANDY are listed in this table. Subscript
e denotes equilibrium value everywhere in this paper.
Variable
symbol
Variable name Deﬁning equation
wth Threshold wealth Eq. (5)
ω Normalized wealth w / wth
CC Commoner consumption Eq. (4) (Fig. 2a)
CE Elite consumption Eq. (4) (Fig. 2a)
αC Commoner death rate Eq. (6) (Fig. 2b)
αE Elite death rate Eq. (6) (Fig. 2b)
η η Eq. (7)
χ Carrying Capacity (CC) Eq. (9)
δ* Egalitarian optimal δ Eq. (10)
χM Maximum Carrying Capacity (Max CC) Eq. (11)
φ Ratio of non-workers to workers (Equitable) Eq. (12)
δ** Equitable optimal δ Eq. (14)
ψ Elite to commoner equilibrium ratio (Unequal) xE,e / xC,e
δ*** Unequal optimal δ Eq. (18)
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rium is independent ofφ and conforms to themaximumcarrying capac-
ity given above by Eq. (11).
4.3. Equilibrium when xE ≥ 0 and κ N 1: Unequal Society
It is possible to attain equilibrium in anunequal society if we can sat-
isfy the following condition:
αM−βE
κ αM−αmð Þ
¼ αM−βC
αM−αm
¼ η: ð16Þ
(The general condition αm ≤ βE≤ βC≤ αM must hold in all cases for
an equilibrium to be feasible.)
The equilibrium values in this general case can be expressed as
follows:
xC;e ¼
γ
δ
λ−η s
δ
1þ κψð Þ
 
xE;e ¼ ψxC;e
ye ¼ η
s
δ
1þ κψð Þ
we ¼ ηρ 1þ κψð ÞxC;e
:
8>>><
>>>:
ð17Þ
The free parameter, ψ, is the equilibrium ratio xE,e/xC,e, apparent from
the second equation in Eq. (17). As opposed to φ, ψ cannot be easily re-
lated to the initial conditions; rather, it can be determined from the re-
sult of a simulation.
Again, the total population xe = xC,e + xE,e can be maximized by
choosing δ appropriately:
δ ¼
2ηs
λ
1þ κψð Þ: ð18Þ
This required depletion rate δ*** can be even larger than the optimal
δ given by Eq. (14) depending upon the values of κ and ψ. In the
presence of inequality, themaximum total population is no longer inde-
pendent of κ and ψ and is smaller than the maximum carrying capacity
given by Eqs. (11) and (15):
xe;M ¼ 1þ ψð Þ
γ
δ
λ
2
¼ γ
ηs
λ
2
 2 1þ ψ
1þ κψ
 
: ð19Þ
5. Scenarios
We discuss three sets of scenarios:
1. Egalitarian society (No-Elites): Scenarios in which xE = 0.
2. Equitable society (with Workers and Non-Workers): Scenarios in
which xE ≥ 0 but κ ≡ 1.
3. Unequal society (with Elites and Commoners): Scenarios in which
xE ≥ 0 and κ N 1.
For all of these scenarios, we start themodel with the typical param-
eter values and initial conditions given in Table 1, unless otherwise stat-
ed. As indicated above, the values of κ and xE(0) determine the type of
the society. Within each type of society, we obtain different scenarios
by varying the depletion factor, δ.
In this section, we will show that HANDY is capable of modeling
three distinct types of societies by changing κ and xE(0). A sustainable
equilibrium can be found for each society by controlling δ. An appropri-
ate choice of δ can make this equilibrium optimal, i.e., with maximum
total population. Increasing δ above its optimal value makes the ap-
proach toward equilibrium oscillatory. Such an equilibrium is subopti-
mal, and the Carrying Capacity is below its maximum value, χM. It is
also possible to reach a suboptimal equilibrium (a less than maximum,
but sustainable population) by making δ lower than its optimal value.However, in the latter case, the approach toward equilibrium would
be a soft landing rather than oscillatory. When δ is increased even
further, the society goes into cycles of prosperity and collapse. Increas-
ing δ beyond a certain point will result in an irreversible Type-N (full)
collapse, examples of which are presented in Sections 5.1.4, 5.2.4,
and 5.3.2. We give a full categorization of collapses in the next two
paragraphs.
Running themodel in different scenarios produces two kinds of col-
lapses, either due to scarcity of labor (following an inequality-induced
famine) or due to scarcity of Nature (depletion of natural resources).
We categorize the former case as a Type-L (Disappearance of Labor)
Collapse and the latter as a Type-N collapse (Exhaustion of Nature). In
a Type-L collapse, growth of the Elite Population strains availability of
resources for the Commoners. This causes decline of the Commoner
Population (whichdoes the labor), and consequently, decline ofWealth.
Finally, Elite Population plummets since its source of subsistence,
i.e., Wealth, has vanished. See Fig. 6a for an example of a Type-L col-
lapse. This could represent a historical case such as the disappearance
of the Mayan civilization in the Yucatan. Note that this type of collapse
can only happen in an unequal society, because themajor cause behind
it is inequality.
a) Soft landing to the optimal equilibrium when Elite
population (marked in red) equals zero. Final population
reaches the carrying capacity, which is at its maximum
value,        , in this scenario.
Egalitarian Society: Soft Landing to Optimal Equilibrium1
1
4
0.5
0.5
2
0
0
0
Time (Year)
Nature
Wealth
Commoners
Carrying
Capacity
Egalitarian Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
Time (Year)
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1
 1
0.5
0
0
0
Nature
Wealth
CommonersCarrying
Capacity
b) Oscillatory approach to equilibrium when Elite popu-
lation (marked in red) equals zero. Final population co-
nverges to the carrying capacity, which is lower than its
maximum value,        , in this scenario.
Egalitarian Society: Cycles of Prosperity and Reversible,
Type-N Collapses
20
10
Time (Year)
2
1
 1
0.5
0
0
0
Nature
WealthCommoners
Carrying
Capacity
c) Cycles of prosperity, overshoot, (reversible Type-N)
collapse, and revival when Elite population (marked in
red) equals zero.
Egalitarian Society: Irreversible, Type-N (Full) Collapse
Time (Year)
20
10
2
1
 1
0.5
0
0
0
Nature Wealth
Commoners
Carrying Capacity
d) Irreversible Type-N collapse (full collapse) when Elite
population (marked in red) equals zero. All the state va-
riables collapse to zero in this scenario due to over-
depletion.
Fig. 3. Experiment results for the Egalitarian society.
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of Nature, followed by a decline of Wealth that in turn, causes a fall
of the Commoners and then the Elites. Depending on the depletion
rate, Type-N collapses can be “reversible” or “irreversible”. After a
reversible collapse, regrowth of nature can trigger another cycle of
prosperity, examples of which can be seen in Figs. 3c and 4c. This
could represent historical cases such as the Greek and Roman
collapses.
When depletion is pushed beyond a certain limit, Nature fully
collapses and the whole system completely collapses after that.
This is why we call an irreversible Type-N collapse a “full” collapse.
Examples of such collapses can be seen in Figs. 3d, 4d, and 6b. This
could represent a historical case such as the exhaustion of Nature
on Easter Island. Type-N collapses can arise because of excessive de-
pletion only (Figs. 3d and 4d), or both excessive depletion and in-
equality (Fig. 6b).
It is important to understand the inter-relation of the depletion fac-
tor, δ, and the Carrying Capacity, χ. The further δ is taken away from its
optimal value, the further χmoves down from its maximum value, χM.
An equilibrium can be reached if and only if χ is not too far away from
χM, which means δ cannot be too far away from its optimal value,
given by Eqs. (10), (14), and (18) in the three types of societies under
consideration. Note that in all of the scenario outputs presented below
(for the three types of societies under consideration), Carrying Capacity
(χ) and theMaximum Carrying Capacity (χM) are calculated from their
deﬁning Eqs. (9) and (11), respectively.
Important note about the units of the vertical axis of all the subse-
quent graphs: Populations, xC and xE, and the Carrying Capacity, χ, areall normalized to the Maximum Carrying Capacity, χM. Nature and
Wealth are both shown in units of Nature's capacity, λ. The top scale
of the vertical axis of the graph pertains to Population(s) and Carrying
Capacity; the middle scale pertains to Nature, which (normally) stays
bounded by 1λ; and the bottom scale is for Wealth.
Note: All the simulations below use the Euler integration method
with a time-step of 1 year and single precision.
5.1. Egalitarian Society (No-Elites): xE = 0
In the four following scenarios, κ does not play any role since we
set xE ≡ 0. We start the depletion rate from δ= δ∗, the optimal equi-
librium value that maximizes the Carrying Capacity, and increase it
slowly to get additional scenarios. The horizontal red line in the
graphs for the four scenarios of this section represents the zero pop-
ulation of Elites.
5.1.1. Egalitarian Society: Soft Landing to Equilibrium
For the scenario in Fig. 3a, δ= δ∗=6.67 × 10−6. Therefore, the car-
rying capacity, χ, is at its maximum level, χM. Notice that Nature also
settles to ye = λ / 2, which is the value that results in the maximum re-
generation rate. This maximal regeneration can in turn support a max-
imum sustainable depletion and population.
If we set δ b δ*, we still see a soft landing to the carrying capacity, χ.
However, χ would be at a lower level than χM because a lower-than-
optimal δ does not correspond to themaximum regeneration of nature,
which is a necessity if we want to have the maximum sustainable
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rium level (compared to λ / 2) for Nature.
Choosing a depletion rate, δ, that is too small to produce enough to
feed the population would result in a collapse, and thus make any equi-
librium impossible even though Nature stays at its maximum capacity.
Of course, this would not occur in the real world as the urge for survival
guarantees humans extract their basic needs from nature.5.1.2. Egalitarian Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
For the scenario in Fig. 3b, δ is increased to δ=2.5δ∗=1.67 × 10−5.
As can be seen from Fig. 3b, the carrying capacity, χ, is lower than its
maximumvalue,χM. Population initially overshoots the carrying capac-
ity, then oscillates, and eventually converges to it since the amount of
overshoot is not too large, just about the order of χ. Note that at the
time the (total) population overshoots the Carrying Capacity, the
Wealth also reaches a maximum and starts to decline.5.1.3. Egalitarian Society: Cycles of Prosperity, Overshoot, Collapse, and
Revival
For the scenario in Fig. 3c, δ is increased to δ=4δ∗=2.67 × 10−5. As
can be seen, Population, Nature and Wealth all collapse to a very small
value. However, after depletion becomes small due to very low number
of workers, Nature gets a chance to grow back close to its capacity, λ.
The regrowth of Nature kicks off another cycle of prosperity which
ends with another collapse. Simulation results show that these cycles,
ending in Type-N collapses (i.e., those that start due to scarcity of
Nature), repeat themselves indeﬁnitely. Therefore, such cycles repre-
sent “reversible” Type-N collapses. This reversibility is possible as long
as δ stays within a “safe” neighborhood of δ*.Time (Year)
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0
Equitable Society: Soft Landing to Optimal Equilibrium
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Non-Workers
Nature
Wealth
Carrying
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a) Equilibrium in the presence of both Workers and Non-
Workers can be attained with slow growth and equitable
salaries.
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Type-N Collapses
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c) Cycles of prosperity, overshoot, (reversible Type-N)
collapse, and revival in the presence of Workers and Non-
Workers.
Fig. 4. Experiment results fo5.1.4. Egalitarian Society: Irreversible Type-N Collapse (Full Collapse)
For the scenario in Fig. 3d, δ is increased further to δ = 5.5δ∗ =
3.67E − 5. The overshoot is so large that it forces Population, Nature
and Wealth into a full collapse, after which there is no recovery. This
is a generic type of collapse that can happen for any type of society
due to over-depletion. See Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.2 for examples of irre-
versible Type-N collapses in equitable and unequal societies, respective-
ly. We include further discussion of these two types of collapses in
Section 6.
We observe that the accumulated Wealth delays a decline of the
population even after Nature has declined well below its capacity, λ.
Therefore, population keeps growing and depleting Nature until Nature
is fully exhausted. At that instance, i.e., when y=0,Wealth cannot grow
any further; indeed, it starts plummeting, causing a sharp fall of the
population level, and eventually its full, irreversible collapse.
5.2. Equitable Society (with Workers and Non-Workers): κ= 1
We take the parameter values and the initial conditions to be the
same as in Table 1, except that this time we set xE(0) = 25 (φ= 0.25)
and κ = 1. We start with the optimal depletion per capita δ = δ**,
which will sustain the maximum population (see Eq. (14)), and will
gradually increase it in order to get the additional scenarios in this sub-
section. Notice that in these cases, xC describes theWorking Population,
while xE describes the Non-Working Population. Everybody consumes
at the same level, sincewe set κ=1, i.e., we assume there is no inequal-
ity in consumption level for Workers and Non-Workers.
5.2.1. Equitable Society: Soft Landing to Optimal Equilibrium
For the scenario in Fig. 4a, δ= δ∗∗= 8.33 × 10−6. Notice that this
is larger than the optimal value in the absence of Non-Workers δ∗ =Time (Year)
20
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1
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0.5
0.5
0
0
0
Equitable Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
Workers
Non-Workers
Nature
Wealth
Carrying
Capacity
b) Oscillatory approach to equilibrium in the presence
of both Workers and Non-Workers is possible when the
overshoot is not too large.
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Equitable Society: Irreversible, Type-N (Full) Collapse
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d) Irreversible Type-N collapse (full collapse) happens
after a period of very fast growth.
r the Equitable society.
Equitable Society: Preventing a Full Collapse
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Fig. 5. The full collapse that happened in the previous scenario, Fig. 4d,
can be prevented by reducing the average depletion per capita. This
can be achieved by either increasing the ratio of the Non-Working to
Working population (high δ, high φ) or decreasing the average work-
load perworker, i.e., decreasing total work hours perweek (low δ, lowφ).
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in Section 5.1.1. This difference arises because xE≠ 0, which in turn
forces the Workers to produce extra in order to support the Non-
Workers. Now, χ b χM because δ= δ∗∗ ≠ δ∗. However, by setting δ=
δ**, the optimal value of δ in the presence of Non-Workers, the total pop-
ulation, xC + xE still reaches the maximum Carrying Capacity, χM, the
same as in Section 5.1. See Eq. (15) and Section 4.2 for a mathematical
description.Unequal Society: Type-L Collapse (Scarcity of Labor)
Time (Year)
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0
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Nature
Wealth (Equivalent)
Elites
Commoners
Carrying
Capacity
a) Population collapse following an apparent
equilibrium due to a small initial Elite popula-
tion when 100. This scenario also shows
a different route to a collapse, in which, al-
though Nature eventually recovers, population
does not.
Unequal Society: Soft Landing to Optimal Equilibrium
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c) With moderate in equality , it is pos-
sible to attain an optimal equilibrium by con-
trolling the birth rates.
Fig. 6. Experiment results fSimilar comments as in Section 5.1.1 apply here when we choose a
lower-than-optimal δ.
5.2.2. Equitable Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
For the scenario in Fig. 4b, δ=2.64δ∗∗=2.20 × 10−5. The total pop-
ulation is equal to the actual Carrying Capacity (smaller than the maxi-
mum Carrying Capacity).
5.2.3. Equitable Society: Cycles of Prosperity, Overshoot, Collapse,
and Revival
For the scenario in Fig. 4c, δ= 3.46δ∗∗= 3.00 × 10−5. The result is
analogous to Fig. 3c which corresponds to Section 5.1.3. As before, the
time at which the total population overshoots the actual Carrying Ca-
pacity is indicated by the fact that Wealth starts to decrease. After
each cycle of prosperity, there is a partial, reversible Type-N collapse.
5.2.4. Equitable Society: Full Collapse
For the scenario in Fig. 4d, δ= 5δ∗∗= 4.33 × 10−5. Once again, we
can see how an irreversible Type-N (full) collapse of Population, Nature,
andWealth can occur due to over-depletion of natural resources as a re-
sult of high depletion per capita.
5.2.5. Equitable Society: Preventing a Full Collapse by Decreasing Average
Depletion per Capita
The case in Fig. 5 is similar to the previous case (see Section 5.2.4 and
Fig. 4d), except that we raised the ratio of Non-Workers to Workers, φ,
from 0.25 to 6. This corresponds to changing xE(0) from 25 to 600,Unequal Society: Irreversible, Type-N (Full) Collapse
Time (Year)
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b) A fast full collapse due to both over-
depletion and inequality
Unequal Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
Time (Year)
Nature
Wealth
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d) With , it is still possible to oscillate
and converge to an equilibrium
or the Unequal society.
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workers, a sustainable equilibrium can be reached due to lower average
depletion per capita — an equivalent δ if everyone contributed equally
to labor. This could also be interpreted as modeling a reduction in the av-
erage workload per worker.5.3. Unequal Society (with Elites and Commoners): xE ≥ 0 and κ N 1
In our examples of an unequal society, the Elites (per capita) con-
sume κ b 10 to 100 times more than the Commoners. Their population,
plotted in red, ismultiplied by κ to represent their equivalent impact be-
cause of their higher consumption. That is whywe use the label “Equiv-
alent Elites” on the graphs in this Section 5.3.
In the ﬁrst two cases, we discuss two distinct, but generic types
of collapse in an unequal society. In these two scenarios, κ = 100.
Then we will show possibility of reaching an equilibrium by reduc-
ing κ to 10 and adjusting the birth rates βE and βC independently. These
two κ=10 scenarios show that in order to reach a sustainable equilibri-
um in an unequal society, it is necessary to have policies that limit in-
equality and ensure birth rates remain below critical levels.5.3.1. Unequal Society: Type-L Collapse (Labor Disappears, Nature
Recovers)
This scenario, presented in Fig. 6a, is precisely the same as the equi-
librium without Elites case presented in Section 5.1.1 (Fig. 3a) except
that here we set xE(0) = 1.0 × 10−3. This is indeed a very small initial
seed of Elites. The two scenarios look pretty much the same up until
about t = 500 years after the starting time of the simulation. The Elite
population starts growing signiﬁcantly only after t= 500, hence deplet-
ing the Wealth and causing the system to collapse. Under this scenario,
the system collapses due to worker scarcity even though natural re-
sources are still abundant, but because the depletion rate is optimal, it
takes more than 400 years after the Wealth reaches a maximum for the
society to collapse. In this example, Commoners die out ﬁrst and Elites
disappear later. This scenario shows that in a society that is otherwise sus-
tainable, the highly unequal consumption of elites will still cause a
collapse.
This scenario is an example of a Type-L collapse in which both Popu-
lation andWealth collapse butNature recovers (to itsmaximumcapacity,
λ, in the absence of depletion). Scarcity of workers is the initial cause of a
Type-L collapse, as opposed to scarcity of Nature for a Type-N collapse.5.3.2. Unequal Society: Irreversible Type-N Collapse (Full Collapse)
The typical scenario in Fig. 6b for a full collapse is the result of run-
ning the model with the parameter values and initial conditions given
by Table 1. Examples of irreversible Type-N (full) collapses in the egali-
tarian and equitable societies are presented in Section 5.1.4 (Fig. 3d) and
Section 5.2.4 (Fig. 4d).
We set a small initial seed of xE(0) = 0.20, κ = 100, and a large
depletion δ=1.0 × 10−4, so that both the depletion δ=15δ* and the in-
equality coefﬁcient κ= 100 are very large. This combination results in a
full collapse of the system with no recovery. The Wealth starts declining
as soon as the Commoner's population goes beyond its carrying capacity,
and then the full collapse takes only about 250 additional years. The de-
clining Wealth causes the fall of the Commoner's population (workers)
with a time lag. The fast reduction in the number of workers combined
with scarcity of natural resources causes theWealth to decline even faster
than before. As a result, the Elites –who could initially survive the famine
due to their unequal access to consumable goods (κ=100) – eventually
also die of hunger. Note that because both depletion and inequality are
large, the collapse takes place faster and at a much lower level of pop-
ulation than in the previous case (see Section 5.3.1, Fig. 5.3.1) with a
depletion rate of δ = δ*.5.3.3. Unequal Society: Soft Landing to Optimal Equilibrium
The following parameter values and initial values can produce the
current scenario (the rest are exactly the same as in Table 1):
βC ¼ 6:5 10−2 βE ¼ 2:0 10−2
xC 0ð Þ ¼ 1:0 10þ4 xE 0ð Þ ¼ 3:0 10þ3
κ ¼ 10 δ ¼ 6:35 10−6
:
8><
>: ð20Þ
The value for δ used in this scenario is δ*** given by Eq. (18). It must
be remembered that ψ= 0.65 is not a parameter that we can choose.
However, it can be read from the result of the simulation since it is the
equilibrium ratio of the Elite to Commoner population. See the second
equation in Eq. (17). On the other hand, η ¼ 112 is determined by the
death and birth rates as well as the inequality coefﬁcient. These param-
eters are chosen in order to satisfy Eq. (16), the necessary condition for
attaining an equilibrium in an unequal society.
The same comments as in Section 5.1.1 hold here if we choose a
lower-than-optimal δ.
5.3.4. Unequal Society: Oscillatory Approach to Equilibrium
The parameter values and initial conditions in the scenario present-
ed in Fig. 6d are exactly the same as the previous scenario, presented in
Fig. 6c, except for δ. It is increased to 1.3 × 10−5, almost 2δ***. This results
in a much lower Carrying Capacity compared to 5.3.3, as can be seen
from a comparison of Fig. 6c and d. Therefore, the total ﬁnal population
in the present scenario ismuch less than the total ﬁnal population in the
previous scenario, 5.3.3 (Fig. 6c) (Table 2).
6. Discussion of Results
We conducted a series of experiments with the HANDYmodel, con-
sideringﬁrst an egalitarian societywithout Elites (xE=0), next an equi-
table society (κ=1)whereNon-Workers andWorkers are equally paid,
and ﬁnally an unequal society whose Elites consume κ times more
than the Commoners. The model was also used to ﬁnd a sustainable
equilibrium value and the maximum carrying capacity within each of
these three types of societies.
6.1. Unequal Society
The scenarios most closely reﬂecting the reality of our world today
are found in the third group of experiments (see the scenarios for an un-
equal society in Section 5.3), where we introduced economic stratiﬁca-
tion. Under such conditions, we ﬁnd that collapse is difﬁcult to avoid,
which helps to explain why economic stratiﬁcation is one of the ele-
ments recurrently found in past collapsed societies. Importantly, in
the ﬁrst of these unequal society scenarios, 5.3.1, the solution
appears to be on a sustainable path for quite a long time, but even using
an optimal depletion rate (δ*) and starting with a very small number
of Elites, the Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in a famine
among Commoners that eventually causes the collapse of society. It is
important to note that this Type-L collapse is due to an inequality-
induced famine that causes a loss of workers, rather than a collapse of
Nature. Despite appearing initially to be the same as the sustainable
optimal solution obtained in the absence of Elites, economic stratiﬁcation
changes the ﬁnal result: Elites' consumption keeps growing until the soci-
ety collapses. The Mayan collapse – in which population never recovered
even though nature did recover – is an example of a Type-L collapse,
whereas the collapses in the Easter Island and the Fertile Crescent –
where nature was depleted – are examples of a Type-N collapse.
In scenario 5.3.2, with a larger depletion rate, the decline of the
Commoners occurs faster, while the Elites are still thriving, but eventu-
ally the Commoners collapse completely, followed by the Elites. It is im-
portant to note that in both of these scenarios, the Elites – due to their
wealth – do not suffer the detrimental effects of the environmental
1 Wewish to acknowledge and thank reviewer No. 1 for highlighting these very impor-
tant points to us.
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lows Elites to continue “business as usual” despite the impending catas-
trophe. It is likely that this is an important mechanism that would help
explain howhistorical collapseswere allowed to occur by eliteswho ap-
pear to be oblivious to the catastrophic trajectory (most clearly appar-
ent in the Roman and Mayan cases). This buffer effect is further
reinforced by the long, apparently sustainable trajectory prior to the be-
ginning of the collapse. While somemembers of society might raise the
alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and
therefore advocate structural changes to society in order to avoid it,
Elites and their supporters, who opposed making these changes, could
point to the long sustainable trajectory “so far” in support of doing
nothing.
The ﬁnal two scenarios in this set of experiments, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, are
designed to indicate the kinds of policies needed to avoid this cata-
strophic outcome. They show that, in the context of economic stratiﬁca-
tion, inequalitymust be greatly reduced and population growthmust be
maintained below critical levels in order to avoid a societal collapse
(Daly, 2008).
6.2. Egalitarian Society
In order to further understand what conditions are needed to avoid
collapse, our ﬁrst set of experiments model a society without economic
stratiﬁcation and start with parameter values that make it possible to
reach a maximum carrying capacity (scenario 5.1.1). The results
show that in the absence of Elites, if the depletion per capita is kept at
the optimal level of δ*, the population grows smoothly and asymptotes
the level of the maximum carrying capacity. This produces a soft-
landing to equilibriumat themaximumsustainable population and pro-
duction levels.
Increasing the depletion factor slightly (scenario 5.1.2) causes the
system to oscillate, but still reach a sustainable equilibrium, although,
importantly, at a lower carrying capacity. Population overshoots its car-
rying capacity, but since the overshoot is not by toomuch – of the order
of the carrying capacity – the population experiences smaller collapses
that can cause it to oscillate and eventually converge to a sustainable
equilibrium. Thus, while social disruption and deaths would occur, a
total collapse is avoided.
A further increase in the depletion factor (scenario 5.1.3) makes the
system experience oscillatory periods of growth, very large overshoots
and devastating collapses that almostwipe out society, but the eventual
recovery of Nature allows for the cycle to be repeated.
Increasing the depletion factor even further (scenario 5.1.4) results
in a complete collapse of the system. This shows that depletion alone,
if large enough, can result in a collapse — even in the absence of eco-
nomic stratiﬁcation.
6.3. Equitable Society (with Workers and Non-Workers)
As the second set of experiments (presented in Section 5.2) show,
HANDY allows us to model a diverse range of societal arrangements.
In this set of experiments, choosing xE ≥ 0 and κ= 1 has allowed us
to model a situation that can be described as having Workers and
Non-Workerswith the same level of consumption, i.e., with no econom-
ic stratiﬁcation. The Non-Workers in these scenarios could represent a
range of societal roles from students, retirees, and disabled people, to in-
tellectuals, managers, and other non-productive sectors. In this case, the
Workers have to deplete enough of Nature to support both the Non-
Workers and themselves.
The ﬁrst scenario, 5.2.1, shows that even with a population of Non-
Workers, the total population can still reach a sustainable equilibrium
without a collapse. In scenario 5.2.2, we ﬁnd that increasing the deple-
tion factor induces a series of overshoots and small collapseswhere pop-
ulation eventually converges to a lower sustainable equilibrium. Like in
an egalitarian society, scenario 5.2.3 shows us that increasing thedepletion parameter further results in cycles of large overshooting,
major collapses, and then eventual recovery of Nature. Scenario 5.2.4
shows us that increasing depletion per capita further can produce an ir-
reversible Type-N collapse.
Finally, scenario 5.2.5, which is a replication of the scenario in
5.2.4 with a much higher ratio of Non-Workers to Workers, shows
that a collapse in an equitable society could be avoided by reducing
the average depletion per capita. We note that this scenario could also
represent a situation where, rather than having paid Non-Workers,
the workload per capita is reduced, with the whole population working
“fewer days aweek”. Such a “work-sharing”policy has been successfully
implemented in Germany over the past few years for reducing unem-
ployment (Baker and Hasset, 2012; Hasset, 2009). Moreover, Knight
et al. (2013) show, through a panel analysis of data for 29 high-
income OECD countries from 1970 to 2010, that reducing work hours
can contribute to sustainability by reducing ecological strain. This con-
clusion agrees with our comparison of the two scenarios, 5.2.5 and
5.2.4, presented above.6.4. HANDY and Brander–Taylor Model
As previously mentioned, a similar use of the predator–prey ap-
proach was applied in the pioneering work of Brander and Taylor
(1998) (BT) to study the historical rise and fall of the Easter Island pop-
ulation. In comparison to their model, with just two equations for
Population and Nature, the introduction of Elites and Commoners,
and accumulated Wealth, results in a greater variety and broader spec-
trum of potential solutions. Moreover, the collapse scenario presented
in BT is somewhat different from the ones presented above. As a matter
of fact, the collapse scenario presented in Fig. 3 of Brander and Taylor
(1998) seems to bemore of an oscillatory approach to equilibrium, sim-
ilar to the one shown in our Fig. 3b, and not a collapse in the sense that
we deﬁne in this paper. Furthermore, the carrying capacity, in the sense
we deﬁne in this paper, is also different fromwhat BT (1998) call carry-
ing capacity. Indeed, their carrying capacity (K) is our Nature's capacity,
λ, which is the maximum size Nature can reach, whereas Carrying Ca-
pacity in HANDY is the population level that can be supported by a
given level of natural resources. Furthermore, BT's carrying capacity is
a constant, whereas Carrying Capacity in HANDY adjusts according to
the level of depletion of Nature.
While sharing certain similarities with the Brander and Taylor
model, our more complex model structure and the use of different as-
sumptions, allows our model to apply to multiple types of societies
with varying socioeconomic structures. Thus, unlike works that tend
to study further implications of the two-dimensional model of BT
(Anderies, 2000), the model we have developed introduces a more
complex set of possible feedbacks and nonlinear dynamics, and a great-
er spectrum of potential outcomes. This allows HANDY to model a dif-
ferent and wider set of thought experiments.
An important feature of HANDY that distinguishes it from predator–
prey, BT, and other similar models (Anderies, 1998; Dalton et al., 2005;
Erickson and Gowdy, 2000; Reuveny and Decker, 2000) is its native ca-
pability for producing irreversible collapses due to the structure for ac-
cumulation of wealth. Our approach also differs from models like
D'Alessandro (2007) that can produce irreversible collapses but only
through explicit introduction of a critical depensation mechanism into
themodel. The dynamics produced by HANDY offer the possibility of ir-
reversible collapses without having to introduce such an additional
mechanism into the model. See Section 5.1.4 for an explanation of irre-
versible collapses in HANDY.1
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Collapses of even advanced civilizations have occurred many times
in the past ﬁve thousand years, and they were frequently followed by
centuries of population and cultural decline and economic regression.
Althoughmany different causes have been offered to explain individual
collapses, it is still necessary to develop a more general explanation. In
this paper we attempt to build a simple mathematical model to explore
the essential dynamics of interaction between population and natural
resources. It allows for the two features that seem to appear across soci-
eties that have collapsed: the stretching of resources due to strain
placed on the ecological carrying capacity, and the division of society
into Elites (rich) and Commoners (poor).
The HumanAndNature DYnamical model (HANDY)was inspired by
the predator and prey model, with the human population acting as the
predator and nature being the prey. When small, Nature grows expo-
nentially with a regeneration coefﬁcient γ, but it saturates at a maxi-
mum value λ. As a result, the maximum regeneration of nature takes
place at λ / 2, not at the saturation level λ. The Commoners produce
wealth at a per capita depletion rate δ, and the depletion is also propor-
tional to the amount of nature available. This production is saved as ac-
cumulated wealth, which is used by the Elites to pay the Commoners a
subsistence salary, s, and pay themselves κs, where κ is the inequality
coefﬁcient. The populations of Elites and Commoners grow with a
birth rate β and die with a death rate α which remains at a healthy
low level when there is enough accumulated food (wealth). However,
when the population increases and the wealth declines, the death rate
increases up to a famine level, leading to population decline.
We show how the carrying capacity – the population that can be in-
deﬁnitely supported by a given environment (Catton, 1980) – can be
deﬁned within HANDY, as the population whose total consumption is
at a level that equals what nature can regenerate. Since the regrowth
of Nature is maximum when y = λ / 2, we can ﬁnd the optimal level
of depletion (production) per capita, δ* in an egalitarian society where
xE ≡ 0, δ∗∗(≥δ∗) in an equitable society where κ ≡ 1, and δ*** in an un-
equal society where xE ≥ 0 and κ N 1.
In sum, the results of our experiments, discussed in Section 6, indi-
cate that either one of the two features apparent in historical societal
collapses – over-exploitation of natural resources and strong economic
stratiﬁcation – can independently result in a complete collapse. Given
economic stratiﬁcation, collapse is very difﬁcult to avoid and requires
major policy changes, includingmajor reductions in inequality and pop-
ulation growth rates. Even in the absence of economic stratiﬁcation, col-
lapse can still occur if depletion per capita is too high. However, collapse
can be avoided and population can reach equilibrium if the per capita
rate of depletion of nature is reduced to a sustainable level, and if re-
sources are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion.
In the upcoming generations of HANDY, we plan to develop several
extensions including: (1) disaggregation of Nature into nonrenewable
stocks, regenerating stocks, and renewable ﬂows, as well as the intro-
duction of an investment mechanism in accessibility of natural re-
sources, in order to study the effects of investment in technology on
resource choice and production efﬁciency; (2) making inequality (κ)
endogenous to the model structure; (3) introduction of “policies” that
can modify parameters such as depletion, the coefﬁcient of inequality,
and the birth rate; and, (4) introduction of multiple coupled regions to
represent countries with different policies, trade of carrying capacity,
and resource wars.
Those interested in obtaining themodel code can contact the authors.
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